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NOTES
in reference to diagrams which were unintelligible to the jury, or
meaningless, without explanation of the witness; and the court
applied the expression to the use of photographs generally without
adverting to the fact that some photographs are intelligible without
explanation. The photographs introduced in the cases where is found
this limitation, either were not representations of the actual situa-
tions or were not intelligible apart from testimony of the witness.
Notwithstanding intimations in these cases, the court admitted X-ray
photographs as evidence for the consideration of the jury in a recent
decision, "upon the same basis as .photographs."29
It is submitted that the photographs in the Honeycutt case were
properly authenticated, and warranted consideration by the jury as
to the nature of the machine upon which it was alleged deceased was
killed. The instructions to the jury that they were not "substantive
evidence," the omission of which caused a reversal, it is believed,
would have been entirely without useful influence upon the jury's
consideration of them.
JoaN H. ANDERSON, JR.
ADVISORY OPINIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA
The Senate of North Carolina forwarded a resolution to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina, requesting advice on the consti-
tutionality of two bills proposing changes in the system of Superior
Courts. A letter in reply, signed by the Chief Justice, expressed
the view that the members of the Court would -be willing to follow
the precedent of their predecessors in giving opinions to the legisla-
to ... (best evidence rule) ... and cross-examination and opposing evi-
dence."
State v. Kee, 186 N. C. 473, 119 S. E. 893 (1923), involved map drawn on
floor, which it was said was not "evidence."
State v. Lutterloh, 188 N. C. 412, 124 S. E. 752 (1924), photograph of re-
constructed scene admissible as "illustrative evidence," explanation of the recon-
structed scene being necessary by witness.
State v. Mitchen, 188 N. C. 608, 125 S. E. 190 (1924), admission as "illustra-
tive evidence" approved.
In Elliott v. Power Co., Varsar, J., said: "It was not error for the court
to allow the jury to consider the pictures for this purpose (explaining witness's
testimony) and to give thein smch weight if any, as the jury may find they are
entitled in explaining the testimony." (Italics ours).
State v. Mathews, 191 N. C. 378, 131 S. E. 743 (1926), is probably the
strongest suport for Honeycutt v. Brick Co., supra note 14. In that case, how-
ever, the photographs were of tableaux vivants, the reconstructed scene of the
crime, the admission of which would have been held error by courts which admit
photographs of the actual, unreconstructed scenes, supra note 5.
Lupton v. Express Co., 169 N. C. 675, 86 S. E. 583 (1915). See 2 WIGUORE,
EVIDENCE §795; Wilson, The X-Ray in Court, 7 CORNELL L. QT. 203.
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tive department, when it appeared that z course of action had been
agreed upon, which involved constitutional questions affecting the
governmental structure and matters of grave public moment, but
that in the present instance the fact that the resolution had been
addressed to the court in its official capacity and the fact that the two
bills showed there 'had been no agreed course of action, prevented
the expression of opinions.1
Before the adoption of the Constitution of 1868, there were two
instances in which requests for advisory opinions were granted. The
first was a contested election -before the Senate which involved the
question of eligibility to vote.2 The second was an opinion on the
meaning of the word "crime", given at the request of the governor.3
Under the Constitution in force before 1868, the duties of the Court
were not prescribed, but were subject to control by the legislature. 4
There is no evidence or intimation in the two opinions of that period
that the legislature ever made it the duty of the Supreme Court to
render advisory opinions.5 The weight given to such opinions was
not that attached to a judicial decision and their conclusions were
not considered as binding.6
The Constitution of 1868 provided for the separation of the
powers of the three departments of government and gave the Supreme
Court a constitutional jurisdiction. When the matter arose for
the first time under this constitution, two of the justices took the
view that it prohibited the giving of advisory opinons, but the remain-
ing three took the view that the members of the Court, as justices,
might render such opinions as acts of courtesy and respect to the
'In the matter of Advisory Opinions, 196 N. C. Appendix (1929).
'Waddell v. Berry, 31 N. C. Appendix (1849).
'In the matter of Hughes, 61 N. C. 57, 64 (1867).
'Stacy, Brief Review of the Supreme Court of North Carolina (1926)4 N. C. LAw Rxvimw 115, stating that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
was created by a legislative enactment in November,- 1818, and that until 1868
the Legislature had the power at any time to abolish the Supreme Court and
the power to elect the members of the Court.5 In Waddell v. Berry, supra note 2, Ruffin, C. J., said: "Although not strictly
an act of official obligation, which could not be declined, yet from the nature of
the questions and the purposes to which the answers are to be applied-being
somewhat of a judicial character-the Judges have deemed it a duty of courtesy
and respect to the Senate to consider the points submitted to them and to give
their opinions thereon."
' State v. Ragland, 75 N. C. 12, 13 (1876), stating: "This conclusion is con-
trary to the opinion of the judges in the contested election case. Waddell v.
Berry (1848) 31 N. C. 319. We do not feel ourselves bound by the opinion in
that case, because it was not a judicial opinion, that is, not given in any case
which the court had jurisdiction to decide, and the reasoning is almost alto-
gether technical."
NOTES
legislative department. 7  The latter view has persisted.8  Such ad-
vice is not an official obligation, there is no authority to render it
voluntarily, but it may be given, when requested. These advisory
opinions have been cited in regularly decided cases as persuasive
authority,9 but not as binding precedents. Obviously, the Court in
the principal case was called on to decide a question smacking mainly
of legislative policy. Its refusal of advice seems sound.
The well established and long continued practice in England by
which the Crowa and the House of Lords consulted the judges on
matters of great moment as to matters of law cannot be compared
with American practice, state and federal, because of the essential
differences in governmental structuie.1o The Federal Courts have
never given advisory opinions. 1 Following the example set by
Massachusetts in 1780, several states have adopted constitutional
provisions making it the duty of the Court to render advisory opin-
'Opinion of The Justices, 64 N. C. 785 (1870), giving the replies of the fivejudges to a joint resolution of the Senate and House of Representatives, request-
ig opinions as to terms of the then members of the General Assembly. Pearson,
C. J., and Dick, J., expressed their willingness to follow the precedents and
give advice as an act of courtesy and respect. Rodman, J., although he declared
that a court should not undertake the political question of the "legitimacy of
the actual reigning sovereign," stated that as an individual he felt free to ex-
press his views. Reade, J., advanced several objections to the rendering of ad-
vice to a coordinate branch of the government: that the instances of such prac-
tice before 1868 were not precedents, because the duties and powers of the court
before 1868 were prescribed by an act of the legislature; that the Constitution
provides that the "Legislative, Executive and Judicial departments shall be
forever separate and distinct"; and that to consider the questions as individuals
is to evade the letter while retaining the spirit. Settle, J., declined to express
an opinion, but expressed no reason therefor.
"The Opinion of the Judges, 114 N. C. 923, 28 S. E. 18 (1894), the judges
giving an opinion, at the request of the governor, respecting the term of office
of the judges, only after the judges, whose tenures of office were affected, hadjoined in the request.. In Correspondence Between House of Representatives
of General Assembly of North Carolina and the Supreme Court of North
Carolina, 120 N. C. 623, 28 S. E. 18 (1897), the judges giving an opinion, at
the request of the House of Representatives, on the validity of a bill involving
the lease of the North Carolina Railroad.
'Leftin v. Sowers, 65 N. C. 251, 255 (1871), cites the Opinion of Justices,
supra note 7, on the question of tenure of office; Sutton v. Phillips, 116 N. C.
502, 506, 21 S. E. 968, 969 (1895), cites the Opinion of the Justices, supra note 7,
on the method of construing a constitutional provision; Rodwell v. Rowland, 137
N. C. 617, 623, 50 S. E. 319, 321 (1905), cites and quotes from the Opinion of
the Justices, supra note 7, as to the duration of a term of an elective office when
there is any doubt as to its duration; Farthing v. Carrington, 116 N. C. 315,
322, 22 S. E. 9, 10 (1895) cites the Opinion of the Justices, supra note 7,
as a precedent for construing a statute regulating preferences by mortgages,
and of general public importance, although the facts stated on the "case
agreed" were not sufficient for the court to render a final judgment.
"
0Hudson, Advisory Opinions of National and Internatiotal Courts (1924)
37 Har. L. Rev. 970.15 C. J. 785.
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ions."2 There has been, however, considerable evasion of the respon-
sibilities thus imposed. In the states which do not have such provi-
sions, there is a division of authorities, the prevailing view, supposed-
ly because of the separation of powers doctrine, being adverse to the
rendering of advisory opinions.1 3 With the single exception of Colo-
rado, in the jurisdictions which do allow advisory opinions, whether
by constitutional provisions or not, the opinions rendered are those of
the judges and not of the court.14
There is a .distinction between the advisory4 opinion and the
declaratory judgment. The former is an assistance rendered to the
other co-ordinate branches of the government, not in the determina-
tion of policies,' 5 but in the definition of certain duties or in the fore-
casting of the constitutionalty of proposed acts. The declaratory
judgment is a method of determining an issue, or issues, between
private parties in advance of trouble or litigation.' Only in the sense
that it gives anticipatory and preventative relief does it resemble an
advisory opinion. Perhaps the nearest approach to a declaratory
judgment in North Carolina is found in Farthing v. Carrington,'7
in which a statute regulating preferences by mortgages was con-
strued although the facts stated on the "case agreed" were not
sufficient for the court to render a final judgment.
The North Carolina attitude toward advisory opinions seems likely
to prevail over the traditional hostility of the American bench and
bar, if success crowns the recent efforts of Mr. Elihu Root to formu-
late a protocol which will be acceptable to the League of Nations and
which will retain the essencei without the arrogance and obscurity,
of the famed Reservation V, of the United States Senate of 1926,
stipulating the terms of the United States' adherence to the World
Court.' 8
A. K. SMITH.
15 C. J. 786, stating that Colorado, Florida, Maine, New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, and South Dakota have constitutional provisions similar to
Mass. Const. c. 3, Art. 2.
" Supra note 10, p. 977.
"Supra note 10, p. 982. "This is the justification of the repeated statement
that advisory opinions are not binding on the courts in later litigation."
"Supra note 1. For a general discussion of advisory opinions, see ARTHUR
R. ELLINGWOoD, DEPARTMENTAL CO-OPERATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT (MC-
Millan, 1918).
"For the present status of declaratory judgments in America, see Borchard,
The Supreme Court and the Declaratory Judgment (1928) 14 Am. Bar
Ass. Jour. 633.
" Farthing v. Carrington, supra note 9.
"Time, March 18, 1929, at 24, states that Reservation V stipulated that
thereafter the court must not "without the consent of the United States enter-
